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NEUROSCIENCE AND SENTENCING
Nancy Gertner*
INTRODUCTION
This symposium comes at a propitious time for me. I am reviewing the
sentences I was obliged to give to hundreds of men—mostly African
American men—over the course of a seventeen-year federal judicial career.1
As I have written elsewhere, I believe that 80 percent of the sentences that I
imposed were unfair, unjust, and disproportionate.2 Everything that I thought
was important—that neuroscientists, for example, have found to be salient in
affecting behavior—was irrelevant to the analysis I was supposed to conduct.
My goal—for which this symposium plays an important part—is to
reevaluate those sentences now under a more rational and humane system,
this time at least informed by the insights of science. The question is how to
do that: How can neuroscience contribute to the enterprise and what are the
pitfalls? This Article represents a few of my preliminary conclusions, but my
retrospective analysis is not complete.
I approach the issue of neuroscience and sentencing from three vantage
points. First, I look at the sentencer’s brain. I ask who the sentencing
decision maker is and what cognitive and other pressures the sentencer
experiences.3 The insights of neuroscience will be a nullity if they are filtered
through a system—like the one I labored under—that makes them irrelevant,
ignored, and even trivialized. Likewise, science will be irrelevant if decades
of a mandatory sentencing system has affected the cognitive lens through
which judges today see the sentencing task, as I believe it has. Nearly thirty
years of sentencing by a flawed formula—of avoiding the exercise of
meaningful discretion; of major changes in the division of labor on
* Senior Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School; Judge (Ret.), U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts. B.A., Barnard College; J.D./M.A. Yale University. This Article is
part of a symposium entitled Criminal Behavior and the Brain: When Law and Neuroscience
Collide held at Fordham University School of Law. For an overview of the symposium, see
Deborah W. Denno, Foreword: Criminal Behavior and the Brain: When Law and
Neuroscience Collide, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (2016).
1. I retired from the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in September
2011.
2. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Undoing the Damage of Mass Incarceration, BOS. GLOBE
(Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/11/04/undoing-damage-massincarceration/9Ww80SKxQm9EbdHxmZG5sM/story.html [https://perma.cc/J6BL-83B3].
3. The model for dealing with the “sentencer’s brain” was laid out in Judge Morris
Hoffman’s superb book, see MORRIS B. HOFFMAN, THE PUNISHER’S BRAIN: THE EVOLUTION
OF JUDGE AND JURY 204–07 (2014), which addressed the evolutionary antecedents of
punishment.
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sentencing between Congress, prosecutors, and the U.S. Sentencing
Commission; and of a relentless focus on retribution and sentencing
disparity, rather than rehabilitation or deterrence—has altered the
“sentencer’s brain.”4 Second, I address the sentencing stage, the context in
which neuroscience may play a role, and the rules governing it. Sentencing
is the territory of what I have described as “good enough” evidence, where
the rules of evidence, including the rules on the admission of expert
testimony set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,5 do not
apply and where there are few constitutional protections guaranteeing the
defense’s access to information. This is a setting that poses considerable
promise and dangers for science: the promise of using neuroscience to
meaningfully individualize sentences on the one hand, and the risks of
manipulation in the introduction of junk science on the other. Third, I
address—at a very preliminary level—what kind of substantive content
neuroscience can bring to sentencing decisions. Because the science is
changing rapidly, this section is suggestive at best. Its implications for
sentencing could well fill a tome, not an article.
I. THE SENTENCER’S BRAIN
For the past three decades, the sentencer’s brain in the federal system and
many state systems has been focused on only one of the traditional purposes
of sentencing6: retribution. In addition, it has focused on one sentencing
problem: the avoidance of unwarranted sentencing disparity between judges.
The resulting sentencing regime was rigid, formulaic, and severe.
Rehabilitation was discredited as a purpose of sentencing in the 1980s
because some social scientists believed that it did not work.7 In addition,
disparate sentencing practices—particularly racial inequities—seemed
inevitable in a system that focused almost exclusively on the individual and
had so little empirical evidence, training, peer review—or any review—to
4. See generally Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little
Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691 (2010) [hereinafter
Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing]; Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to
Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523 (2007) [hereinafter
Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence]. I focus on federal sentencing first because it is
the system with which I am most familiar but also because of the significance of federal
sentencing practices on state systems. Although state courts account for the vast majority of
criminal prosecutions, federal law had an outsized impact on their work.
5. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6. The traditional purposes of sentencing are retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and
rehabilitation. See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal
Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 753 (2006).
7. See Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform,
35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974). Robert Martinson later recanted his 1974 work. See Robert Martinson,
New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 243, 252 (1979) (noting that “new evidence” led him to reject his prior conclusion).
Indeed, rehabilitation was challenged by progressive groups like the American Friends Service
Committee: “The ideal to which reformers have been urging us is theoretically faulty,
systematically discriminatory in administration and inconsistent with some of our most basic
concepts of justice. The 200-year-old experiment has failed.” AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM.,
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 12 (1971).
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support it.8 But in the past decade, concerns about mass incarceration, the
continued racial imbalances, and high cost of imprisonment after the 2008
Great Recession, have led to a growing emphasis on what some scholars have
called the “new rehabilitation,”9 this time apparently grounded more in
science—especially neuroscience—and with apparently more modest aims.
It is worth reviewing rehabilitation’s history and failures, if only as a
cautionary tale, for what it may forecast about the new rehabilitation’s use of
neuroscience in sentencing. And it is likewise worth reviewing the threedecades-long sentencing regime that existed between the old rehabilitation
and the new to evaluate the changes, if any, it has made in the sentencer’s
brain.
A. The Ideal of Rehabilitation
From the turn of the century through the 1980s, the predominant view was
that crime was a “moral disease.”10 Sentencing mimicked a medical model
in which judges were charged with tailoring the punishment to the
individual—in effect, coming up with a “cure.”11 The problem was that
judges did not know how to exercise their considerable discretion.
Sentencing was not taught in law school. To the extent that there was any
debate about the efficacy of programs or approaches, it was on the pages of
scholarly journals, not in judicial courses.12 As I have noted, “[i]t was as if
judges were functioning as diagnosticians without authoritative texts,
surgeons without Gray’s Anatomy.”13
Until the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“the
Guidelines”) in 1987, appellate review of sentences was extremely limited.
If judges were not asked to give reasons for their sentences, they did not do
so. Few bothered to write sentencing opinions. Nor was there peer review,
as there would be in a medical setting.14

8. I have discussed this at length in several articles. See generally Gertner, A Short
History of American Sentencing, supra note 4; Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence,
supra note 4.
9. See Mark R. Fondacaro et al., The Rebirth of Rehabilitation in Juvenile and Criminal
Justice: New Wine in New Bottles, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 697, 698 (2015); Meghan J. Ryan,
Science and the New Rehabilitation, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 261, 289 (2015).
10. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1186 (1993).
11. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (“Today’s philosophy of
individualizing sentences makes sharp distinctions for example between first and repeated
offenders. . . . Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law.
Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders [are] important goals of criminal [law].”).
12. Kate Stith and Judge José Cabranes note that “law faculties had long regarded
sentencing as a ‘soft’ sub-specialty of criminal law, populated primarily by aficionados of
psychiatry, sociology, social work, and other such branches of the ‘social’ sciences.” KATE
STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 26 (1998).
13. Gerter, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 4, at 528.
14. Efforts to guide judicial discretion, as with sentencing councils or sentencing
information systems, failed in the years preceding the Sentencing Reform Act. See generally
James R. Thompson & Gary L. Starkman, Book Review, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 152 (1974)
(reviewing MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972)).
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Unwarranted disparity among judges was inevitable. Judge Marvin
Frankel described the disparities as the result of “the unruliness, the absence
of rational ordering, the unbridled power of the sentencers to be arbitrary and
discriminatory.”15 There was no common law of sentencing that would have
constrained discretion—as there was, for example, in torts or contracts—
precisely because there were few formal sentencing opinions, even at the trial
level.
Constitutional review of sentencing decisions was limited;
proportionality challenges based on the Eighth Amendment or due process
were rare and, more significantly, rarely successful.16
Without meaningful studies and evidence, judicial training, or peer
review—or indeed, any appellate review—rehabilitation during this period
involved more faith than science. It was no surprise that the system resulted
in longer sentences and disparity in sentencing between judges—especially
racial disparity—and, as a result, a considerable backlash. To avoid that
backlash, the new rehabilitation must avoid these pitfalls.
B. Mandatory Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums
By the 1980s, for a variety of reasons that I have addressed elsewhere,17
retribution and disparity avoidance dominated the federal sentencing regime,
giving rise to harsh mandatory minimum sentences and mandatory
guidelines.18 In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act19 (SRA),
creating a new agency, the U.S. Sentencing Commission (“the Sentencing
Commission” or “the Commission”), charged with creating and
implementing sentencing guidelines. While not immediately apparent from
the enabling legislation,20 the Sentencing Commission began to supplant
judges as experts in sentencing. That result might have been helpful if the
first Commission had been composed of actual experts and if the Guidelines
it produced were the product of careful research. Neither was the case.21 The
Commission was political from the outset, without real sentencing expertise
among its members.22 Congress had no problem regularly intervening or

15. FRANKEL, supra note 14, at 49. Some scholars have suggested disparity was nowhere
near as substantial as the pre-Guidelines scholarship suggested. See STITH & CABRANES, supra
note 12, at 111.
16. See Kevin Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison
of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1443 (1997). See generally Nancy
Gertner, On Competence, Legitimacy, and Proportionality, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1585 (2012).
17. See Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing, supra note 4.
18. See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 37, 40–41 (2006).
19. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
20. Daniel Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on
the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1744–45 (1992); Gertner, From
Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 4, at 529–30.
21. See FRANKEL, supra note 14, at 119–20 (explaining that the Commission called for
only “people of stature, competence, devotion, and eloquence,” in particular, “lawyers, judges,
penologists, . . . criminologists . . . sociologists, psychologists, business people, artists
and . . . former or present prison inmates”); see also Gertner, A Short History of American
Sentencing, supra note 4, at 700.
22. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 48.
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ignoring it, passing mandatory minimum sentences and directing the
Commission to raise particular guidelines. A number of states likewise
created sentencing commissions, implementing sentencing guidelines,
although none were as detailed and rigid as the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.23
The Guidelines were, as Professor Kate Stith and Judge José Cabranes
described it, “a compilation of administrative diktats”24 that the Commission
“promulgated and enforced ipse dixit.”25 They were not informed by the
purposes of sentencing; there was no legislative history, no findings
describing why the Commission made the choices it did. They were
unmoored from any evidentiary showing, let alone the insights of science,
and they were severe. They comprised “back-of-an-envelope calculations
and collective intuitive judgments.”26 While the Commission claimed to
base the Guidelines on existing practice, its data were limited and its analysis
skewed.27 It took the existing sentencing lengths and increased them, using
Congress’s mandatory minimum sentences as the base levels, making
sentencing even harsher.
The Commission made other problematic decisions. The Guidelines were
complex and numerical. They were keyed to the “objective” facts of the
offense and the offender, like the quantity of drugs or the amount of loss on
the one hand, and the offender’s criminal record on the other—criteria that
would maximize retribution and minimize judicial discretion. They rejected
most of the factors that had been salient pre-Guidelines, including concepts
of mens rea, the traditional basis for moral culpability, and, as I describe
below, an area in which neuroscience could well have an impact. Although
the statute directed the court to consider the “history and characteristics of
the defendant,”28 most factors personal to the offender and salient to
neuroscientists were treated as largely irrelevant—drug or alcohol

23. Significantly, the American Law Institute wholly rejected the federal guideline regime
in its efforts to propose a model penal code for sentencing. See KEVIN R. REITZ, AM. LAW
INST., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT 115–25 (2003), http://www.lhc.ca.gov/
studies/185/sentencing/2003ModelPenalCode-ReitzAttachmentAJune06.pdf
(discussing
defects in the federal sentencing system) [https://perma.cc/Q98U-JK2Y].
24. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 95.
25. Id.
26. Michael Tonry, The Questionable Relevance of Previous Convictions to Punishments
for Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED
PERSPECTIVES 91, 93 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010).
27. See Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing, supra note 4, at 701.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
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dependence, gambling addiction,29 “lack of guidance” as a youth,30 even
“mental and emotional conditions.”31
To be sure, with the enactment of the Guidelines, there was considerably
more judicial training in sentencing than there had ever been prior to their
enactment, during the era of the “old rehabilitation.” Significantly, this was
training in the application of the Guidelines’ formulas and how to compute
the numbers, but there was still no training on the purposes of sentencing,
alternatives to incarceration, what works to prevent recidivism or to effect
deterrence. The Sentencing Commission would not permit any other agency
to provide training on sentencing, even though the Federal Judicial Center,
whose mission was to train judges, was well equipped to do so. As
neuroscience and psychology advanced, their insights could not make it into
federal sentencing in any systematic way. It was, in effect, a closed system,
unaffected by science and moved only by the pathological politics of crime,
in which the Guidelines were mechanistically and uncritically enforced.
This was especially the case at the appellate level. Judges on the appellate
courts, who had never had to address sentencing appeals before the SRA, and
may never have sentenced anyone before they became appellate judges,
rigorously enforced the Guidelines—the only sentencing framework they
knew.32
The result was more than a change in sentencing practices; it was a change
in the lens through which federal judges viewed sentencing. While before
the Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences judges saw sentencing as
an aspect of an American judge’s unique competence, and even as essential
to judicial independence, those attitudes shifted dramatically in thirty short
years.33 Many federal judges came to believe that they were not competent
to sentence at all absent explicit rules externally promulgated by Congress or
the Commission and that these entities had more expertise than they had.
And sentences that would have been unthinkable decades ago were
commonplace. As I noted:
Twenty years of Guideline sentencing has transformed the federal bench.
It did so not only for judges who came of age during the Guidelines era. It
was also for those who had practiced criminal law, or had been on the bench
pre-Sentencing Reform Act. . . . It is a tectonic shift in the way judges see
the job of sentencing. Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences have
29. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015)
(“Drug or alcohol dependence or abuse ordinarily is not a reason for a downward departure.
Substance abuse is highly correlated to an increased propensity to commit crime. . . . In
certain cases a downward departure may be appropriate to accomplish a specific treatment
purpose.”).
30. Id. § 5H1.12 (“Lack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a
disadvantaged upbringing are not relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted.”).
31. Id. § 5H1.3 (“Mental and emotional conditions may be relevant in determining
whether a departure is warranted, if such conditions, individually or in combination with other
offender characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the
typical cases covered by the guidelines. . . . In certain cases a downward departure may be
appropriate to accomplish a specific treatment purpose.”).
32. See Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 4.
33. See id. at 524.
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simply normalized sentences that would have been obscene years ago. We
have come to view imprisonment as the appropriate punishment for all
crimes with the only question being how much.34

So substantial was the change that even when the Guidelines became
advisory after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Booker,35 when extraordinary advances in neuroscience offered the
possibility of a new kind of rehabilitation, little if anything changed in federal
sentencing. And this result is all the more extraordinary because appellate
review of non-Guideline sentences post-Booker is supposed to be deferential
to the lower court.36 In the post-Booker era, one would have expected judges
to regularly consider evidence-based practices, neuroscientific insights into
conditions like addiction, or the impact of toxic stress and childhood
adversity. They have not done so. Instead, the new rehabilitation is reflected
only at the periphery of federal sentencing—a pretrial diversion program in
a handful of courts, a drug-treatment program in others, a reentry program
34. Nancy Gertner, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing—Real or Imagined, 28 FED. SENT’G
REP. 165, 166 (2016) (footnotes omitted).
35. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In 2005, the Supreme Court made the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines advisory, not mandatory, to remedy a Sixth Amendment challenge to them. See id.
at 246.
36. In a series of decisions post-Booker, the Supreme Court authorized district courts to
set a sentence based on its “reasonableness” in the light of the very general statutory factors
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), regardless of whether such a sentence was within the Guidelines
range. And substantive appellate review of such a sentence would be under an abuse of
discretion standard, the most deferential standard of all. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261–64; see also
Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (per curiam) (reversing a within-Guideline
sentence, holding that “[t]he Guidelines are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they
are also not to be presumed reasonable”); Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2009)
(ruling that a sentencing judge could reject advisory Guidelines based solely on policy
considerations); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101–02 (2007); Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (holding that a sentencing judge could consider factors
regardless of whether they were allowable under the Guidelines). According to one judge, the
Guidelines “are finally just guidelines.” John Gleeson, The Sentencing Commission and
Prosecutorial Discretion: The Role of Courts in Policing Sentence Bargains, 36 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 639, 660 (2008). While these principles have been interpreted differently in appellate
courts throughout the country, it is clear that a reasoned decision varying from the Guidelines’
rigidity should survive substantive appellate review. For example, of the 61,866 defendants
sentenced between 2006 and 2014 in trial courts in the Eleventh Circuit, the court held that
just fifteen sentences were substantively unreasonable. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789
F.3d 1249, 1274 (11th Cir. 2015) (surveying downward variance sentences in the Eleventh
Circuit). At an April 2, 2014 Federalist Society event at the Harvard Law School, in which
the author participated, Judge Reena Raggi of the Second Circuit noted that few if any district
court sentences were reversed since Booker. Judge Edith Jones of the Fifth Circuit went
further, complaining that the “‘reasonableness’ determination . . . defies appellate
explanation” because appellate courts “have no principled way to disagree with, much less
overturn, such disparate sentences.” See Memorandum from Edith H. Jones, Chief Judge, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 4 (Nov. 20, 2009),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-andmeetings/20091119-20/Jones.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JDB-KHDN]. Judge Danny Boggs of
the Sixth Circuit expressed a similar sentiment, writing in dissent, “I find it difficult to express
a way in which a judge can adequately say that a sentence is ‘too much’ or ‘too little’ in any
form of words.” United States v. Funk, 534 F.3d 522, 531 (6th Cir.) (Boggs, J., dissenting),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 05-3708, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 27700 (6th Cir.
Dec. 18, 2008).
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here, a veterans’ court there—all the while the Guidelines approach is
unchanged.
Indeed, recent neuroscience has suggested that the Guidelines sentencing
approach has affected the sentencer’s brain in profound ways, which affects
how policymakers should go about changing the system.
C. The Sentencer’s Brain
and the Institutions That Support It
In recent years, neuroscientists have focused their attention on the
sentencer’s brain, the neural underpinnings of punishment decisions. One
study described the results of a functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) experiment in which subjects’ brains were scanned while they were
evaluating culpability and while they were evaluating the magnitude of
punishment.37 Different brain regions were involved in the respective tasks:
subjects used their right dorsolateral prefrontal cortices to determine
culpability and their social and affective processing brain networks
(particularly the right amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior
cingulated cortex) to assign sentences.38 The former were brain regions
classically associated with cognitive tasks, like numerical processing, while
the latter were brain regions associated with social-emotional processing, like
intuitions.39
Applying these conclusions, one scholar suggested that the Guidelines
framework has taken these two aspects of third party punishment and divided
them between different institutions.40 The Commission is tasked with
making those “intuitive and nonrational . . . decisions,” which formerly
judges made, while federal judges are tasked with applying them using their
cognitive-quantitative functions.41
In effect, the Guidelines enabled judges to cede moral decision making to
another body; their task became the application of an apparently rational
formula to the case at hand—a purely cognitive process. The change would
have been salutary if the Guidelines that federal judges were applying
formulaically were fair, appropriate, driven by evidence, transparent, or
evidence based. As described above, they were not. Federal sentencing

37. See Joshua W. Buckholtz et al., The Neural Correlates of Third-Party Punishment, 60
NEURON 930 (2008).
38. Id. at 932–33, 935.
39. Id. at 934, 936 (describing the “‘cold’ deliberate computations supported by the
prefrontal cortex and ‘hot’ emotional processes represented in socio-affective brain
networks.”). Indeed, I wonder whether this is simply the neuroscience version of what
scholars studying bureaucracies have said for years—that bureaucracy is supposed to drive
emotion and subjective desire out of administrative decisions. See, e.g., PETER M. BLAU &
MARSHALL W. MEYER, BUREAUCRACY IN MODERN SOCIETY (2d ed. 1956).
40. See Rebecca Krauss, Comment, Neuroscience and Institutional Choice in Federal
Sentencing Law, 120 YALE L.J. 367, 369 (2011).
41. Id.
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embodied the illusion of a rational process, but in reality was something
else—what one writer described as “equal nonsense for all.”42
To be sure, the same social-emotional processing involved in punishment
decisions also enabled racist and stereotypical thinking pre-Guidelines. The
challenge going forward is to create a system that acknowledges that
sentencing an individual involves more than the application of a formula, that
it involves judgment and discretion, all the while avoiding the pitfalls of the
pre-Guidelines regime. This would be a system informed by appellate
review, and even peer review, with evidence-based guidance from
neuroscience, social psychology, and psychiatry—not mandatory diktats.
Such a system would have to abandon the other impediments to
meaningful reform that psychologists and neuroscientists have identified in
the federal system. For example, so long as there are numerical guidelines,
they will skew the results of sentencing—what social psychologists call
“anchoring.” Judges are apt to “come up with or evaluate numbers by
focusing on a reference point (an anchor) and then adjusting up or down from
that anchor.”43 The Guidelines manual—with its 300 odd pages of directives
and a numerical grid—provides a readymade anchor.44 Sentencing
procedures that have evolved around a Guidelines structure would have to
change. Guidelines sentencing, at least in some courts, is rote; post-Booker
discretion should take more time, more resources, different training and
analysis, different sources of information, a different kind of monitoring, and,
as I describe below, different evidentiary rules.
II. THE SENTENCING CONTEXT:
GOOD ENOUGH EVIDENCE
The context in which sentencing decisions are made has not materially
changed from the days of rehabilitation, even as sentencing shifted from a
purely discretionary system to a mandatory, structured one. It is a setting in
which evidence, including expert evidence, is not tested as rigorously as it is
at trials, with important implications for neuroscience and the new
rehabilitation.
When rehabilitation was the dominant philosophy, there were few if any
limits on the information that the judge was supposed to have. It made no
more sense to limit the kind of information that a judge could receive and
rely on at sentencing in exercising his “clinical” role—to cure the “moral
disease”—than to limit the information available to a medical doctor in

42. Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 25, 81 (2005) (quoting Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of the Sentencing
Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 918 (1991)).
43. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2515 (2004).
44. Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 137, 138 (2006), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/what-yogi-berra-teachesabout-post-booker-sentencing# [https://perma.cc/9RKG-WA3W].
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determining a diagnosis.45 Over time, different standards of proof and
evidence evolved between the trial stage and the sentencing stage.46
The trial stage is the stage of constitutional rights, formal evidentiary rules,
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. At sentencing, the rules of evidence
do not apply. Hearsay and character evidence is admissible.47 The standard
of proof is the lowest in the criminal justice system: a fair preponderance of
the evidence. Additionally, the risk of error is allocated differently at trials
and at sentencing. Many of the rules of evidence applicable at trial are
justified by the concern that a presumptively innocent man not be convicted;
the risk of error is on the prosecution. In some cases, potentially probative
evidence is excluded, not simply based on the risk of a wrongful conviction,
but also based on concerns about the decision maker, a lay jury. Character
evidence, particularly evidence of prior crimes, is excluded because the jury
may overvalue it, finding a propensity to commit crimes, which is
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence.48 But once a defendant is
convicted, the rules change: the constitutional protections are minimal, the
emphasis shifts from protecting the innocent to seeking the truth,49 and the
decision maker is a judge, presumed to be capable of separating the wheat
45. See Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 4, at 527. Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), reflected this approach. The jury convicted Williams of first degree
murder and recommended life imprisonment. The judge disagreed, sentencing him to death.
While Williams had no criminal record, the judge, relying on information in the presentence
report that was inadmissible at trial, concluded that the defendant had committed a string of
uncharged burglaries, that he had a “morbid sexuality,” and that he was a “menace to society.”
Id. at 244. “Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law,” the Court
declared. Id. at 248. Rather, “[r]eformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become
important goals of criminal jurisprudence.” Id. Any restrictions upon a trial judge’s ability to
obtain pertinent information “would undermine modern penological procedural policies.” Id.
at 250. See generally Claire McCusker Murray, Hard Cases Make Good Law: The Intellectual
History of Prior Acquittal Sentencing, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1415 (2010) (discussing
Williams).
46. See Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L.
REV. 569, 571 (2005).
47. In a policy statement, the Commission declared that the sentencing judge may consider
relevant information without regard to the rules of evidence, so long as the information has
“sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). On its face, the standard
seems somewhat more stringent than the “minimal indicium of reliability” of the preGuidelines era. See United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663–64 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting
United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir. 1982)). The Commission commentary
noted that under pre-Guidelines practice, sentencing factors were often determined informally,
in part because offense and offender characteristics “rarely had a highly specific or required
sentencing consequence.” See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 1997). In contrast, under the Guidelines, resolution of disputed facts
has “a measurable effect on the applicable punishment.” Id. But while the Commission has
suggested that “[m]ore formality” is unavoidable if sentencing is to be accurate and fair, the
law is murky as to how far “[m]ore formality” extends. Id.; e.g., United States v. Little, 61
F.3d 450, 453 n.2 (6th Cir. 1995).
48. See Judith M.G. Patterson, Evidence of Prior Bad Acts: Admissibility Under the
Federal Rules, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 331, 331 (1986).
49. Murray, supra note 45, at 1424–25. See generally Nancy Gertner, Circumventing
Juries, Undermining Justice: Lessons Learned from Criminal Trials and Sentencing, 32
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 419 (1999).
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from the chaff without the need for the usual rules. In this very different
setting, the floodgates are open to all sorts of evidence, including bad
character evidence, evidence of the defendant’s remorse, prior crimes
charged and uncharged, and even acquitted conduct.50
Significantly, Daubert does not apply at sentencing. The standard at
sentencing is that the evidence must have “sufficient indicia of reliability to
support its probable accuracy,”51 nothing like Federal Rule of Evidence 702
and its attendant decisional law. While the scholarly literature is replete with
criticisms of the application of Daubert in trial settings, expert testimony at
sentencing raises even more significant problems. For example, Dean David
Faigman and others have described the “G2i” problem: the problem of
drawing inappropriate inferences about individuals from group data.52
Inferences from group data, however, are frequently admitted in individual
sentencing proceedings in the form of actuarial data about risk assessment,
testimony about recidivism rates, or general experiential accounts about gang
behavior. Indeed, because this is a setting in which folk generalizations about
character, deterrence, and recidivism are too often bandied about, it is
unlikely that a court would strictly limit expert testimony on “G2i” grounds
even as a matter of judicial discretion.
Neuroscience testimony could well be offered by prosecutors to show
aggravating factors and by defense lawyers to show mitigating factors. While
Professor Deborah Denno’s longitudinal studies found no instance of the
prosecution using neurogenetic evidence as an aggravating factor in capital
cases, the past may not predict the future, particularly in noncapital cases
where the rules are more relaxed.53 After all, federal courts did not enhance
50. See generally Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771
(2003). While mandatory guidelines and mandatory minimums attached determinate and
severe consequences to sentencing findings, for example, about drug quantity and criminal
record, relaxed sentencing procedural rules (a legacy from the past sentencing regime) made
those factors easier to prove.
51. United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 380 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1992)); accord United States v.
Ferron, 357 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2004).
52. David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert
Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 420 (2014) (describing the G2i problem as the “gap
between conventional scientific practice and ordinary trial practice involves the challenge of
reasoning from group data to decisions about individuals (an analytical process that we
designate as ‘G2i’). . . . [A]ll expert evidence, whether based on controlled experimental
research or years of experience, presents G2i issues. Experts testify to such matters as the
conditions likely to lead to false confessions, the indicia of schizophrenia, factors that
contribute to eyewitness misidentification, the cancer-causing properties of benzene, and
thousands more. These are all general—population-based—statements about the empirical
world. They are the ‘G’ of G2i and represent the ordinary perspective of most research and
most expertise. However, in the courtroom, the operative questions pertain to the particular
case at hand, the ‘i’ of G2i: Did the suspect falsely confess? Does the defendant have
schizophrenia? Was the witness’s eyewitness identification accurate? Did benzene cause the
plaintiff’s leukemia?”).
53. See generally Deborah W. Denno, Courts’ Increasing Consideration of Behavioral
Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases: Results of a Longitudinal Study, 2011 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 967. And in the short term at least, there are practical difficulties for the prosecution to
compel neurogenetic or neurological evidence from an unwilling defendant. See Teneille
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procedural protections in noncapital sentencing, even as sentences have
increased. In effect, there is capital sentencing, with some protections,54 and
the “ordinary sentencing,” largely without.
The rules of relevance also are considerably more relaxed at sentencing.
At trial, to determine the relevance of a particular brain defect, a court would
be concerned about the causal relationship between it and the crime at issue.
But at sentencing, the issues are broader. It does not matter whether the
defendant’s addiction caused his illegal behavior, ostensibly a trial question.
The issue is whether his addiction impairs his potential for rehabilitation, a
sentencing question. A judge might sentence an addict who committed a
bank robbery differently than someone who is not an addict, even if that
addiction did not cause the crime, because what it takes to restore his life may
be different. The brain lesion identified by a neurologist may not have
diminished the defendant’s capacity to commit the crime, but it could be an
impediment to his ability to recover from the consequences of his conviction.
In short, neuroscience offers considerable promise—as I describe below—
but considerable dangers, in a setting that, until now, has not been geared
toward a critical examination of the evidence.
III. NEUROSCIENCE AT SENTENCING:
THE “NEW REHABILITATION”
The “new rehabilitation”—now informed by neuroscience and evidencebased science—offers the possibility of yet another shift in American
sentencing away from retribution toward an approach more finely tailored to
the individual, his needs, and his future.55 The challenge will be to avoid the
perils of the “old rehabilitation” and its overreliance on faith. Grounded in
empirical findings, there should be less concern about disparity in sentencing
by judicial actors. When a judge sentences a drug addict to an addictiontreatment program with a proven track record, that sentence can serve as a
precedent for similarly situated offenders. Judicial training can go beyond
Guidelines-speak. Judges can be trained in how to evaluate what works and
what does not and what offenders would be amenable to which sentencing
alternatives. A sentencing commission can evaluate programs in terms of
their efficacy, publicize the best practices in sentencing drug-addicted
offenders or juveniles rather than enforcing compliance with the Guidelines.
Neuroscience can help inform administrators about prison conditions—the
impact of solitary confinement on prisoners, the unique issues associated
Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence
of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1133 (2010). But see
Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351, 352 (2012).
54. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a Wall?:
The Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More
Broadly, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 158 (2009). The Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), may spell a change in the Court’s willingness to scrutinize
procedures in noncapital cases as well. See generally Nancy Gertner, Miller v. Alabama: What
It Is, What It May Be, and What It Is Not, 78 MO. L. REV. 1041 (2013).
55. See, e.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes
Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1775 (2004).
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with juvenile offenders, and the effect of prison violence. It can address
programmatic issues within the walls—which programs work, which do not.
It can help tailor postrelease programs by establishing a continuum of care,
bearing in mind the impact of prolonged confinement.
But again, there are pitfalls. Some of the most important work on the
impact of social and economic deprivation in early childhood may be entirely
appropriate for policy discussions but is not necessarily helpful to individual
sentencing. The National Scientific Council on the Developing Child, for
example, has studied the impact of excessive or prolonged “activation of the
stress response systems” on the brain architecture, learning, behavior, and
long-term health. It concludes that “if the stress response is extreme, long
lasting, and buffering relationships are unavailable to the child, the result can
be toxic stress, leading to damaged, weakened bodily systems and brain
architecture, with lifelong repercussions.”56 These observations, while
critically important to understand offenders, raise problems when applied to
sentencing. Precisely because this description applies to so many offenders
in the criminal justice system—as my own judicial experience suggests—it
does not help to individualize any given one. The overwhelming majority of
the young men I sentenced had some form of toxic stress during early
development—from childhood abuse, trauma from witnessing a shooting (or
being shot themselves), chaotic personal relationships, malnutrition, extreme
poverty, et cetera. More significantly, the “toxic stress” literature does not
offer a remedy. Indeed, precisely because it describes problems so
intractable and results so difficult to reverse, it could have the same pitfalls
as the old rehabilitation, namely providing a rationale for the longer
imprisonment of these offenders.
Likewise, risk-assessment instruments, which enable a more informed
choice about which offenders will recidivate than the judge’s “back of the
envelope” intuition, may well be skewed by inappropriate generalizations
based on race or gender. While these instruments ostensibly look only at
demographic information, after decades of mass incarceration and racial bias
in the criminal justice system, the demographics are themselves distorted,
particularly by race.57
And then there is the question of resources. The more neuroscientific
evidence is introduced into sentencing proceedings, the more stress is put on
the resources of the criminal justice system. There is surely a risk that only
wealthy defendants will offer this evidence. For example, poorer defendants’
records suggested that when they acted up in high school, they were labeled
disciplinary problems and expelled. Their subsequent criminal behavior
would be presented before me without a mitigating explanation. For wellheeled offenders, in contrast, acting up in high school would be more likely
56. Nat’l Sci. Council on the Developing Child, Excessive Stress Disrupts the
Architecture of the Developing Brain 1 (Harvard Univ. Ctr. on the Developing Child, Working
Paper No. 3, 2014), http://developingchild.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2005/05/Stress_
Disrupts_Architecture_Developing_Brain-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V65-673R].
57. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization
of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 819 (2014).
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to lead to a psychiatric referral and their subsequent criminal behavior cast in
a more sympathetic light.
CONCLUSION
The discussion about the role of neuroscience in courts largely has focused
on two settings: the culpability determination and capital cases, not ordinary
sentencing. Culpability determinations raise important questions about
criminal responsibility. But sentencing is different. It is not only backward
looking, reevaluating culpability to a degree, but it is also forward looking,
considering recidivism, deterrence, and rehabilitation. And, in making that
far more complex determination, the sentencer should use all of the new tools
at his disposal, so long as he understands the history and risks.

